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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT oF LAws - STATE INTEREST NOT SOLE CRITERION
IN CHOICE OF APPROPRIATE LAW - MORE GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS HELD COGNIZABLE- Decedent, a New York resident, while
on a short business trip in Maine, was fatally injured in an
automobile accident. Subsequent to the accident and prior to
the commencement of a wrongful death action by the deceased's
wife, the defendants, owner and operator of the vehicle, changed
their residence from Maine to New York. In denying defendants'
partial defense which asserted the application of Maine law, the
New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the appellate division,
held that since New York has the predominant interest in the
litigation, its law shall apply. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12,
237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
The earliest choice of law rule in New York was that the
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties were governed by
the law where the tort occurred3 This rule, known as lex loci
delictus, was predicated upon the doctrine of vested rights 2 and
was not without its shortcomings. Indeed, the fact was widely
recognized that, at times, the situs of the tort did not have
a sufficient nexus to warrant the interjection of its law.3
Realizing this factor, as well as the trend of the state courts
to depart from the general conflicts rule in an effort to develop
more rational solutions to choice of law questions, 4 the New
' Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128,
185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959); Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509
(1943). See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 (1963). The American Law Institute adopted this
rule in 1934, although it has since changed position. RESTAT=-NT, CoN-
FLIcr OF LAws 1967-69 (1935).
2 For a brief analysis of the vested rights doctrine see 3 BEArx, CoN-
FLiCT OF LAWS 1967-1969 (1935).3 See also Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 178 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1949); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957). It has been subsequently observed by Mr. Chief Justice Traynor of
the California Supreme Court:
As the forum we must consider all of the foreign and domestic
elements involved in this case to determine the rule applicable. Reich
v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1967).
4 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962). See, e.g., Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 178
(1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARv. L. RFv. 361, 379-85 (1945); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of
the Applicable Law, 52 COLum. L. REV. 959 (1952); Ehrenzweig, The Lex
Pori-Basic Rule in the Conflicts of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657
(1959).
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York Court of Appeals, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,5
instituted the first major departure in New York State tort law
from the lex loci delictus approach.6
In Kilberg, a New York domiciliary while on route from
New York was fatally injured when the plane in which he was
a passenger crashed in Massachusetts. The Court, although pro-
ceeding under Massachusetts law as to right of recovery, refused
to apply the Massachusetts monetary limitation for wrongful
death, actions. Instead, the Court reasoned that the dominant
interest of New York in the litigation, together with the fortuitous-
ness of the accident site, demanded application of New York's
policy of prohibiting arbitrary monetary limitations. Thus, right
was distinguished from remedy and an. exception to the lex loci
delictus doctrine was formulated.
The Kilberg approach, however, was soon recognized as
unsatisfactory.7 Therefore, two years later, in Babcock v. Jackson,.
the New York Court of Appeals reevaluated this doctrine and
decided to abandon it completely.
In Babcock, plaintiff-passenger, while travelling in Ontario,
was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence
of his host. Both parties were New York residents; the ex-
cursion had originated and was terminated in New York; and,
the automobile was registered and insured in New York.
Recognizing, however, that the law of one of the interested
jurisdictions should not be applied exclusively to all the issues
in dispute, the Court stressed the independent determination of
each issue by the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest
interest in the particular matterY As such, the policies which
were effected by the laws in conflict were isolated and the Court
sought to determine the relative interests of the jurisdictions in
light of their contacts with the case. Applying this contact-
interest approach, the Court concluded that New York law had
the most direct and compelling interests in the litigation and
should, therefore, control. The policies and interests behind the
5 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
6 This approach had already been abandoned in the area of contract.
See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
7 See Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S2d
17 (1962) which severely limited Kilberg to the expressions of New York's
strong public policy with respect to arbitrary limitations in wrongful death
actions.
8 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
! Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752. For an extensive
discussion of this aspect of Babcock, see Baer, Two Approaches to Gtest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechanical Jurisprudence Versus Gropingfor Contacts, 16 Bur'. L. REv. 537, 549-54 (1967). See also, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum.
L. Rzv. 1212, 1249 (1963).
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conflicting laws, in its opinion, were clear. The Ontario guest
statute had as its object the prevention of collusive suits arising
out of the host-guest relationship against Ontario insurance car-
riers.10 In contrast, New York had developed a strong policy
of protecting all passengers injured as a result of a driver's
negligence despite the risk of collusive suits when the driver-
passenger relationship was also one of host-guest.1
While Babcock effectively repudiated the out-moded rule of
lex loci delictus,' 2 it was a rather ambiguous step in the develop-
ment of the conflict of laws in New York State. Babcock, in
reality, had involved only a "false" or "spurious" conflict since
the contacts and policies were so readily conducive to the ap-
plication of New York law that no real conflict existed.13 Con-
sequently, in 1965, in Dym v. Gordon,14 the Court of Appeals en-
gendered difficulty in interpreting this contacts-interest approach.' 5
10 Id. at 484, 191 N.F_2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
"1 As the Court stated, not only did New York have the most compelling
interest but, in addition, there appeared to be no legitimate interest at all
by Ontario which a denial of recovery could advance. Thus, Babcock pro-
vided an excellent situation for the refutation of the lex loci delictus
doctrine.
12 See also, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 558, 360 P.2d 906,
12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203
A.2d 796 (1964), wherein the abandonment of lex loci delictus in other
jurisdictions is exemplified.
13 Since Babcock, New York courts have on numerous occasions referred
to the decision by name or approach. In the majority of these cases, how-
ever, there has been no more than passing reference, implying that the
conflict rules are in a process of re-examination. Baer, supra, note 9, at
554-55. Basically, there are three reasons for this outlook. Firstly, since the
fact pattern in Babcock was so conducive to the application of New York
law, the decision has been deprived of a great deal of its viability. Secondly,
in an effort to buttress the reasoning of the majority, the Court relied upon
the approach taken by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFLIcTs OF LAw, which
has been criticized for its seemingly "quantitative approach." Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLua.
L. REv. 1212, 1245 (1963) (Ehrenzweig's view). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CoNriicr OF LAws § 379 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964). Thirdly,
the Court's confusing use of "interests" and "contacts," often seemingly de-
fining one in terms of the other, has been a mainspring of inconsistency in its
application.
'4 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
Is The difficulty in deciding D3w could have been forecast from an earlier
New York Court of Appeals decision. Several months before Dyin, in
Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.
2d 557 (1965), the Court was presented with a conceptual fact situation
which closely paralleled Babcock. In holding that the law of the jurisdiction
which had the most significant relationship and contacts with the matter in
dispute should govern, the Court utilized what appears to have been a
qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. That is, rather than applying
the law of the jurisdiction having the most numerous contacts, the Court
applied the law of the jurisdiction wherein the most significant contacts were
located. However, in summarizing the support for its conclusion, the Court
198]
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In Dym, plaintiff-guest and defendant-host, both domiciliaries
of New York, were involved in an automobile accident in Colorado.
Both parties were living in Colorado for the summer, and the
host-guest relationship had originated and was to terminate in
that state.
In an opinion purporting to be an application of Babcock,
the Court held that the Colorado guest statute, rather than the
New York law, should control. The Babcock approach was re-
stated as requiring isolation of the issues, identification of the
policies underlying the laws in controversy and, finally, evaluation
of the contacts involved.'8
After finding the issue to be whether a guest should recover
from a negligent driver, the Court concentrated upon the contacts,
apparently disregarding the relative importance of the policies to be
effectuated. In the analysis of contacts, the facts were strongly
distinguished from those in Babcock. First, unlike Babcock, the
parties were not in transit but were temporarily residing in
Colorado; secondly, the physical situs of the host-guest relationship
was in Colorado and not in New York.
While attempting to dispel any possible implication that either
the situs of the relationship or the time of its creation was alone
controlling, 17 these factors, together with "the general intent of
the parties as inferred from their actions," 'I led the Court
to conclude that in no sense could the situs of the accident be
considered fortuitous.
Dissenting, Chief Judge Fuld found the position taken by the
majority to be inconsistent with Babcock which gave controlling
effect to the law of the jurisdiction with the predominant interest in
the resolution of a particular issue. Although agreeing with the ma-
jority's affirmation of Babcock's rejection of the inflexible rule of
lex loci delictus, he contended that the majority opinion was ad-
hering to an equally mechanical and arbitrary doctrine of giving
controlling effect to the jurisdiction in which a relationship origin-
ated irrespective of the policy sought to be implemented. On
what Chief Judge Fuld considered the essential issue of policy con-
siderations, he found no factual basis for distinguishing Dyn
from Babcock.
seemed to have stressed the quantitative by a listing of the relevant contacts.
Thus, it was confusing what approach the Court did take and it was
equally unclear whether contacts or interests or a combination of both was
the rule to be applied for a proper application of Babcock. See Note,
Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of Lazvs, 52 VA. L. REv. 302, 307-
09 (1966).
1, 16 N.Y.2d- at 124, 209 N.E2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
17 Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
i8 Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S2d at 466.
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The confusing question of whether Babcock mandated a con-
tacts approach or an analysis of policy again arose in Macey v.
Rosbicki.'1  In Macey, plaintiff and defendant, New York domi-
ciliaries, met in Ontario where defendant maintained a summer
residence. While on a short trip in Ontario, plaintiff-passenger
was injured when the automobile driven by the defendant collided
with another vehicle. 20  In applying the law of New York, the
Court concluded that the action was properly within the purview
of Babcock and therefore controlled by New York law. The
Court relied upon the factual affinity between this case and Babcock,
distinguishing Dyrn primarily on the duration of the stay and situs
of the relationship. Therefore, as in Dym, the decision evolved
not on the basis of policy, but instead, upon the nature of the
contacts with the respective jurisdictions.
In a lengthy concurrence, Judge Keating viewed the factual
situation of the present case as "indistinguishable" from that pre-
sented in Dyrn and the result reached in the latter as "irreconcila-
ble" with that of Babcock.21 The concurring judge argued that
neither the origin of the relationship, the duration of the trip,
nor its locale were of more than minor significance, since they bore
no relation to the interests or policies sought to be affected by the
laws in conflict.22  Further recognizing the great emphasis which
Dyr placed upon the intent of the parties in determining which
law would govern their rights, Judge Keating took issue with the
Court's engaging in fictions for "no apparent reason." 23 It was
his opinion that neither in Babcock, Dym nor this case had the
parties any intent as to what law would govern their rights. As
Dyin had been an apparent source of confusion and dissent, in
that it failed to give controlling significance to those contacts re-
lating "to the policies sought to be vindicated by the ostensibly
conflicting laws," 24 the concurrence called for a limitation of Dynt
before it became "encrusted" in the law of New York.25
'9 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
20 Prior to the commencement of the action the driver of the other
vehicle settled with the defendant. Therefore, the fact that a third party was
involved in the accident did not affect the outcome of the litigation.
21 18 N.Y.2d at 298, 221 N.E.2d at 385, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (concurring
opinion).
22 As stated by Judge Keating, "the interest a particular jurisdiction
has in the application of its law should and can only be determined by
an examination of the facts of the case in light of the relevant policy
considerations." 18 N.Y.2d at 296, 221 N.E.2d at 384, 274 N.Y.S.2d at
597 (concurring opinion).23Id. at 297, 221 N.E2d at 384, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (concurring
opinion).24Id. at 295, 221 N.E.2d at 383, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (concurring
opinion).
25 Id. at 299, 221 N.E2d at 385, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (concurring
opinion).
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While the validity of Judge Keating's criticism of Dyrn was
not immediately approved, his reasoning in Macey gradually gained
support. Thus, in Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 26 a wrongful
death action, the Circuit Court of Appeals held applicable the law
of New York despite a post-accident change in domicile by the
widow. Adopting the "interest analysis" approach developed by
his concurring opinion, the court found that New York's policy
proscribing statutory limitations upon damages recoverable in
wrongful death actions was based upon the state's dual interest in
preserving a citizen's life and in providing for the survivors.27
Paralleling these refinements in tort, in the area of the right
of election in the disposition of a decedent's property the movement
away from Dym and Macey was clearly demonstrated. In In re
Crichton,25 the New York Court of Appeals was unanimous in
its decision to apply New York law to the estate of a decedent who
left his stocks, bonds and savings accounts in Louisiana to his
children and made no provision for his wife. Louisiana's interest
in the property stemmed from its presence there and from the
fact that the securities were purchased out of proceeds of deced-
ent's business ventures in that state. New York's contact was as
marital domicile of the decedent and his widow. It was the con-
tention of the Court that this choice of law problem required, as
noted in Babcock, isolation of the issue, identification of the under-
lying policy considerations embodied in the laws in conflict and
an examination of the contacts of the respective jurisdictions. In
relation to the final step in this three-stage process, the Court
noted: "Contacts obtain significance only to the extent that they
relate to the policies and purposes sought to be vindicated by the
conflicting laws." 29 Following this rationale to its logical conclu-
sion, the Court decided that as the facts or contacts were presented,
New York, being the marital domicile, had "not only the dominant
interest in the application of its law and policy but the only
interest." 30
26373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Long v. Pan American
World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965),
where a unanimous court specifically held that the Babcock approach
was applicable to wrongful death actions as well as to actions not resulting
in death. Undoubtedly, courts had previously been restrained to make this
extension because wrongful death actions, unknown at common law, are
created by statute.
27 373 F.2d 717, 723 (2d Cir. 1967).
2820 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
29Id. at 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d at 806 n.8, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820-21 n.8.
3gld. at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820. See also In
re Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288, N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968); Farber
v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 281 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967)
where, in an analogous situation, the Court supported the Babcock approach.
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With the benefit of this background, the establishing of a
contacts-interest approach -in Babcock, its confused interpretation
in Dym and Macey and, in turn, the modification of Dym's
reasoning in Gore and Crichton - the New York Court of Appeals
was confronted with a similar conflict of laws question in Miller
v. Miller.3 1
In Miller, a New York resident, while on a short business
trip in Maine, died as a result of injuries sustained in an automo-
bile accident. Shortly thereafter, defendants, residents of Maine,
relocated to New York. As a partial defense to a wrongful death
action commenced by the decedent's wife, defendants pleaded the
Maine limitation on recoveries in effect at the time of the accident
but since repealed.
The Court, in applying New York law, concluded that in the
interests of justice "controlling effect should be given . . . to the
law of the jurisdiction which because of its relationship.., has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation."3 2
Admitting the inconsistencies with which past decisions had inter-
preted the contact-interest approach of Babcock, the Court stated
its method for determining the applicable law: "[T]he facts or
contacts which obtain significance in defining state interests are
those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in con-
flict." 33 Moreover, relying on Crichton, the Court noted that
"contacts obtain significance only to the extent that they relate to
the policies sought to be vindicated by the conflicting laws." 3"
Recognizing New York's ardent public policy which has
chosen, via constitutional provision,35 not only to permit full recov-
ery but to prohibit any legislative enactment which would attempt
to do otherwise, the Court contrasted this interest with counter-
vailing claims alleging the reliance on and, therefore, necessity
for application of Maine law. Paramount among these considera-
tions was the fairness of applying New York law where a non-
resident or resident had acted in consonance with the law of the
particular jurisdiction in which the transaction had occurred as
well as the possible interest of a sister state in providing remedies
for conduct within its borders.
After careful analysis, the Court concluded that it perceived
no general considerations which would warrant the application of
Maine law. Specifically, the Maine statute was not of the nature
3122 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
321d. at 15, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736, qotiing Babcock,
12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.33M. at 16, 237 N.E2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
341d. at 17, 237 N.E.2d at 880, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 738, quoting Crichton,
supra, note 28.
35 N.Y. CoNST. art. 1 § 18.
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upon which a person would pattern his conduct. The only possible
reliance would have been the purchase of liability insurance pur-
suant to the remedies available to an injured party. However,
since the standard automobile liability policies issued in Maine did
not differentiate between protection for wrongful death or personal
injuries, and, since there was no monetary limitation for personal
injury actions, no proper claim that the defendants relied upon this
limitation in purchasing insurance could have or, in fact, was made.
In answer to the argument that the choice of law applied
should be determined in accordance with reasonable expectations
of the litigants as evidenced by their intercourse with the state
where the tort occurred, the Court noted that although the country
consists of separate jurisdictions, people invariably act as if they
were governed by the laws of a single jurisdiction. Considering
the real party in interest, it was maintained that even if the insurer
may have reasonably expected the enforcement of the Maine limi-
tation, this could not be the sole determinative factor since the
insurance policy was not and could not have been limited to
affording protection to only those accidents occurring in Maine.
Again, therefore, the possibility of liability in excess of $20,000
was not unexpected and there appeared to be no reason to deny
the application of New York law.
Finally, in examining whether the application of New York
law would unduly impinge upon a legitimate interest of a sister
state in regulating the rights of its citizens, the Court observed
that to the extent the limitation evinced a desire to protect Maine
residents in wrongful death actions, its purpose would not be de-
feated because the defendants were no longer residents of that state.
Although aware that the danger of forum shopping would, at times,
require a court to ignore a post-accident change in domicile, this
subsequent change, the court stated, had been proven to be un-
related to a desire to achieve a more favorable legal climate.
Judge Breitel, in dissent, premised his argument for the applica-
tion of Maine law on the existence of a "true conflict" 36 in that
both Maine and New York had an interest in applying their rules
regarding damage limitations. Emphasizing the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties as the prevailing consideration, the dissent
noted that the parties had established a settled and persistent local
relationship in Maine which, insofar as it most strongly evidenced
the litigants' reliance on Maine law, should be of vital importance
in determining the most interested jurisdiction.
While Judge Breitel recognized that under a choice of law
technique based upon interest analysis the law of New York
could be applied, it was his contention that such an approach would
3622 N.Y.2d at 25, 237 N.E.2d at 885, 290 N.Y.S.2d at-.
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invariably result in a person carrying the law of his domicile
wherever he travelled. Furthermore, as states have an interest in
applying their law to protect the "legitimate objects of their legis-
lative concern" and, since this includes persons other than domicili-
aries, individuals would, in addition, carry with them a number of
varying personal laws invocable at will. The effect of this applica-
tion, he contended, would result in the substitution of a rigid
personal law reminiscent of lex loci delictus.
With reference to the majority's consideration of the post-
accident events, the dissent reasoned that the repeal of the Maine
statute was significant only to the extent it suggested that the
former policy was waning and should, therefore, yield to the New
York constitutional policy of providing unlimited recovery. The
inadvisability for considering post-accident changes in domicile
was based upon the dangers of forum shopping and collusive suits
which, as Judge Breitel stated, are legitimate objects of a state's
legislative concern.
Finally, in summarizing, Judge Breitel expressed concern that
his opinion might be interpreted as a rejection of the contacts-
interest approach. Rather than excluding or relying on any one
particular theory, "the objective," Judge Breitel stated, "is to
achieve justice in a particular case and cases of like kind, avoiding
ideology, on the one hand, and particularistic result-oriented deter-
minations, on the other." 37 Thus, it was his contention that "in
this very difficult and still inchoate field of law a case-by-case
development of rules is necessary" 8s in order to establish sound
judicial principles.
Underlying all choice of law decisions from Babcock to
Miller, the basic premise has been that courts should apply the
law of the most appropriate jurisdiction in the disposition of
specific issues.3 9 This is the major consideration which brought
about the rise and subsequent demise of the traditional lex loci
approach and which warrants a developmental approach in an
effort to find a suitable successor. While the opinions of Babcock
and its successors have provided little specific direction to courts
presented with an actual conflict of interests, the "Babcock process"
does provide a conceptual framework for the proper resolution of
the large number of choice of law problems which present no
actual conflict between state interests. Failing, therefore, to pro-
vide any definite criteria for the resolution of future controversies,
Babcock did, however, recognize that rules predicated upon con-
37 Id. at 33, 237 N.E.2d at 890, 290 N.Y.S.2d at-.38 Id.
39 Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 1212, 1251 (1963) (Reese's view).
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ceptualistic reasoning rather than actual experience are bound to
fail.
The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals in Miller
represents both a return to and refinement of this rationale.
Premised upon Babcock, "grouping of contacts" or "center of
gravity" requires a "qualitative" evaluation of the most compelling
relationship. This "qualitative" analysis of relevant contacts is
cast, necessarily, in terms of jurisdictional policies and interests.
Thus, contacts obtain significance only as they relate to the vindi-
cation of the underlying policy considerations present in the osten-
sibly conflicting laws.
Failing to appreciate this fact, however, the appellate division,
in Tooker v. Lopez, 40 has reverted to the quantitative approach of
Dym in holding that a wrongful death action arising out of an out
of state accident was precluded by a Michigan guest statute. While
Dyrn, however, served a useful purpose in the development of a
modem conflicts approach by demonstrating that no single criterion
is to be formulated, Tooker, although benefited by Miller, refused
to consider this instant case as relevant. Ignoring the fact that,
at the least, Dym was limited by Miller to its precise facts, Tooker,
therefore, represents a backward step in the choice of law problem.
Indeed, Miller, if recognized, goes far in resolving much of
the confusion engendered by Babcock and its more immediate pro-
geny. Contrary to such decisions as Macey in which there was no
extended discussion of policy or interest considerations, the Court,
in Miller, scrutinizing the law-fact pattern before it, was forced to
explicitly adopt a strict "interest analysis" approach. Illustrative
of this is the Court's determination of liability partly on the basis
of post-accident events. Relying in part upon Gore, the Court
recognized that post-accident transactions could have a significant
effect upon a jurisdiction's interest in the application of its law.
Further cognizant of Maine's proper concern in protecting
local insurers, the Court proceeded to investigate the effect of the
imposition of greater liability upon the real party in interest. Ex-
amination of the policies sought to be effected by the conflicting
laws leads inevitably to the Court's result that, as the facts were
presented, the application of New York law in no way impinged
upon a proper legislative concern of Maine.
Such an approach amplifies the utility of the "Babcock process"
in discerning between the real and spurious conflicts and is further
demonstrative of the intense analysis often required to differentiate
between the two. By express adherence to such methodology Miller
provides a useful standard by which the significance of contacts are
40330 App. Div. 2d 115, 290 N.Y.S.2d 762 (3rd Dep't 1968).
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to be determined and thus, introduces a degree of consistency and
predictability of result into this area of law.
The essence of Miller, however, is not to be overlooked. The
Court is not merely formulating an exact rule or standard to be
procedurely applied but, instead, views interest analysis as merely
representing a consideration to be employed in the establishment of
a modem rule of law. Illustrative of this attitude is the Court's
recognition of the significance of countervailing considerations
which in its collective judgment should concern the disposition of
justice in a modern court. Miller, therefore, does not, as contended
by the dissent, adopt domicile per se as the controlling considera-
tion. Rather, the Court establishes a flexible approach which seems
to reduce the danger Qf such parochialism by qualitatively examin-
ing all relevant factors before a determination is reached.
X
TAXATION - CoomRATE SPIN-OFS - REORGANIZATION PLAN
MUST DISTRIBUTE EIGHTY PERCENT CONTROL To QUALIFY FOR
SECTION 355 NONRECOGNITION PROVISION.
In 1961, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (Pacific)
established the Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company (North-
west) and transferred all of its non-California assets and $100,000
to Northwest in exchange for all the Northwest stock and a
$2,000,000 demand note. In the same year Pacific distributed to its
shareholders transferable rights to purchase fifty-seven percent of
the Northwest stock at a price substantially less than its fair mar-
ket value. The remaining forty-three percent was disposed of
twenty-one months later through a similar offering. Taxpayers
exercised almost all of their rights to acquire the Northwest stock,
but failed to report the difference between the fair market value of
the stock and the option price paid as income from stock dividends
on their federal income tax returns. The Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits disagreed on the qualification of the
Pacific spin-off for the nonrecognition of gain treatment that Sec-
tion 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, under certain circumstances,
affords to stockholders of a controlling corporation who receive
shares of the controlled subsidiary. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that the fifty-seven percent distribution in
1961 was not protected by the corporate spin-off exemption since
section 355(a) (1) (D) requires that the distribution divest the con-
trolling corporation of at least eghty percent control of the con-
trolled corporation. This prerequisite could not be satisfied by
the Pacific step-transaction plan which was too indefinite to unite
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